Remuneration Report for the 2023/2024 financial year

of the Dr. Hönle Aktiengesellschaft, Gilching

Management Board remuneration

The following remuneration report in accordance with Section 162, German Stock Corporation Act provides individualised information on the remuneration granted and owed to current and former members of the Management Board and Supervisory Board of Dr. Hönle Aktiengesellschaft, Gilching (Dr. Hönle AG) in the past financial year.

1 Basic features of the system for Management Board remuneration

The remuneration system for members of the Dr. Hönle AG Management Board is geared towards sustainable corporate development and the achievement of strategic corporate goals. In the absence of a personnel committee, the Management Board remuneration system is defined directly by the Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board may involve external independent consultants, as required.

The remuneration system makes a significant contribution to promoting and implementing the corporate strategy of Dr. Hönle AG. It is based on both short-term variable remuneration and long-term variable remuneration and, in the process, sets different performance criteria. In order to link remuneration to the Company's long-term performance, the long-term variable remuneration makes up a specific part of total remuneration.

The remuneration system for Management Board members is clear and easy to understand. It corresponds to current requirements of the German Stock Corporation Act. In the event of significant changes, but at least every four years, the remuneration system resolved by the Supervisory Board is submitted to the Annual General Meeting for approval.

2 The remuneration system in detail

2.1 Overview of remuneration components and their respective share in total remuneration

Remuneration for members of the Management Board consists of fixed and variable components. Fixed remuneration components include the Management Board member's fixed annual salary, fringe benefits and pension contributions.

Remuneration component	Assessment basis/parameters
Non-performance-based	50% of total target remuneration
components (fixed	
remuneration)	
Base remuneration	Fixed, contractually agreed remuneration paid in twelve equal monthly
	instalments, less statutory withholdings
Fringe benefits	 Provision of a company car, including for private use, with operating and maintenance costs included
	 Insurance (accident insurance and D&O insurance with a deductible)
	 Payment of employer's contribution to health and long-term care
	insurance up to the statutory maximum
Retirement benefits	Annual retirement benefit amount
Performance-based components (variable remuneration)	50% of total target remuneration
Short-term variable	• Type: annual target bonus subject to financial and non-financial
remuneration (short-	performance criteria; makes up 40% of variable remuneration
term incentive, or	• Financial performance criteria: e.g. sales revenue, EBIT/EBIT margin, cash
STI)	flow, free cash flow, ROCE, working capital; make up 75% of the STI
	Non-financial performance criteria: Environment/Social/Governance – ESG
	targets, in particular measures to improve employer attractiveness and
	employee satisfaction; make up 25% of the STI
	 Performance period: one year

	 Limit: 150% of the STI target amount Payout: annually in cash
Long-term variable remuneration component (LTI)	 Type: performance share plan (virtual shares); makes up 60% of variable remuneration Financial performance criteria: e.g. EBIT, EBITDA, working capital, ROCE, economic value added; make up 60% of the LTI Non-financial performance criteria: Environment/Social/Governance – ESG targets, in particular measures to promote leadership development, diversity and equal opportunity; make up 40% of the LTI Performance period: three-years Limit: 150% of the LTI target amount Vesting period: one year Payout: in cash after the vesting period
Maximum remuneration	Fixed maximum amount for each Management Board member

2.2 Determination of total target remuneration by the Supervisory Board, appropriateness of Management Board remuneration

The Supervisory Board determines the performance criteria and the level of target achievement required to receive the total target remuneration amount ("total target remuneration") for each member of the Management Board for the upcoming financial year in line with the remuneration system. The total target remuneration corresponds to the total amount of remuneration paid for short-term and long-term variable remuneration components, assuming 100% target achievement based on the performance criteria. The objective is to ensure that the respective remuneration is commensurate with the duties and the performance of the Management Board member and the situation of the Company, is geared toward ensuring the long-term, sustainable performance of the Company and the Hönle Group, and does not exceed customary remuneration levels without a specific reason.

Both external (horizontal) and internal (vertical) comparisons are used to assess the appropriateness and customary level of remuneration, as described in the following.

2.2.1 External (horizontal) comparison

The Supervisory Board refers a suitable peer group (horizontal comparison) to assess the appropriateness and customary nature of the total target remuneration paid to Management Board members in comparison with other companies. For the purposes of the peer group comparison, the market position of the Company is compared with that of other companies. The peer group is made up of technology companies with a similar structure as Dr. Hönle AG in terms of their sales revenue, number of employees and market capitalisation. In selecting the peer group, the Supervisory Board considers the remuneration structure, total target remuneration and individual remuneration components as well as the maximum total remuneration paid by peer companies.

2.2.2 Internal (vertical) comparison

The internal (vertical) comparison involves determining the ratio of Management Board remuneration to the remuneration paid at the Company's second management level. In doing so, the Supervisory Board examines the Management Board remuneration relative to the remuneration paid at the first management level below the Management Board. The Supervisory Board also considers the evolution of the remuneration paid to those groups over time as well as the relationship between them.

2.2.3 Remuneration components

The following bullet points list the share in total target remuneration of each remuneration component. The percentage amounts shown for short-term and long-term variable remuneration were calculated on the assumption of 100% target achievement. The amounts relevant for target achievement are set by the Supervisory Board for the respective financial year based on the budget, including the strategic budget.

- Fixed remuneration is not performance-related and comprises the base remuneration plus fringe benefits and a pension contribution. The fixed remuneration component accounts for 50% of the Management Board member's total target remuneration.
- Variable remuneration is performance-related and is made up of short-term incentives (STIs) and long-term incentives (LTIs). The variable remuneration component likewise accounts for 50% of the Management Board member's total target remuneration.
- Of the total variable remuneration, STIs account for 40% and LTIs for 60%.

2.2.4 Maximum total remuneration threshold (maximum remuneration)

The Supervisory Board has set a maximum threshold for the total remuneration paid out to Management Board members ("Maximum Total Remuneration"). The Maximum Total Remuneration amount may not exceed

- EUR 1,200,000.00 for the chairperson of the Management Board, insofar as a chairperson has been appointed; or
- EUR 800,000.00 for the other members of the Management Board.

The Maximum Total Remuneration that a member of the Management Board may receive is limited not only to the financial year in which it was earned; there is also an absolute upper limit on payments in later financial years.

The Supervisory Board may permit exceptions to the Maximum Total Remuneration in specific cases, especially in the event of extraordinary developments or to compensate for lost income from a previous appointment in the case of newly appointed Management Board members.

2.3 Disclosures on individual remuneration components

2.3.1 Fixed remuneration components

Base remuneration consists of a fixed amount paid in 12 equal instalments over the year at the end of each month, after deducting statutory withholdings. The Supervisory Board considers the role and the responsibilities of the respective Management Board member in setting the base remuneration amount.

If a member is appointed to or leaves the Management Board during the course of the financial year, their base remuneration will be prorated for the financial year in question in accordance with the duration of the Management Board member's contract during that year.

Fringe benefits such as those described in the following may also be granted to Management Board members:

- Provision of a company car, including for private use, with operating and maintenance costs included;
- Payment of employer's contribution to pension, health and long-term care insurance up to the statutory maximum;
- Provision of D&O insurance with a deductible, or adding the Management Board member to the Company's D&O policy.

When a new member is appointed to the Management Board, the Supervisory Board may grant a suitable bonus payment at its due discretion in specific cases. Any such payment may be used, for example, to compensate for losses in variable remuneration that a member of the Management Board may have incurred as a result of switching to the Company from another company.

2.3.2 Variable remuneration components

The variable remuneration components include both short-term and long-term components. The short-term variable remuneration component in the form of the annual bonus and the long-term variable remuneration component in the form of the performance share plan differ in terms of their underlying performance periods and in the financial and non-financial performance criteria used to calculate the payout. The performance criteria are selected to reflect the

Company's corporate strategy and is geared towards growth, profitability and competitiveness. Non-financial performance indicators are also taken into account.

2.3.2.1 Short-term variable remuneration (STI)

Purpose and calculation of the STI

The short-term variable remuneration paid out in the form of a bonus is intended to reward members of Management Board for their contribution to the Company's success during a specific financial year. In addition to financial performance criteria, it includes non-financial performance criteria relating to the collective or individual performance of Management Board members and the achievement of other non-financial targets, for instance targets relating to the implementation of strategic corporate goals, organisational performance or good corporate governance. The Supervisory Board ensures that the variable remuneration targets are based on ambitious strategic performance parameters for the Company, with the actual amount paid out depending on the degree of target achievement. The targets with respect to financial performance parameters are based on the budget prepared by the Management Board and approved by the Supervisory Board. When selecting the performance parameters for variable remuneration components, the Supervisory Board ensures that they are distinctly measurable and strategically relevant.

The short-term variable remuneration amount is calculated as follows:

For each Management Board member, the Supervisory Board sets a target amount for the bonus ("STI Target Amount") in the agreement entered into with the respective Management Board member. The bonus is granted if 100% of the STI Target Amount for a specific financial year is achieved. The Supervisory Board establishes the target achievement level for the financial performance criteria as well as the annual targets for the non-financial performance criteria in advance for the respective financial year and communicates them to the Management Board member.

The financial performance criteria are based on metrics that can be derived from the Company's consolidated financial statements. The bonus amount depends on the level of target achievement. No bonus is paid if the level of target achievement is below 80%, and the bonus is capped at 150% of the STI Target Amount if the targets established are exceeded ("STI Cap"). Thus the target corridor ranges from 80% to 150%. When establishing the STI Target Amount and calculating the level of target achievement, financial performance criteria are weighted at 75% and non-financial performance criteria at 25%.

If a member is appointed to or leaves the Management Board during the course of the financial year, the Supervisory Board may decide at its due discretion to pay short-term variable remuneration on a pro rata basis in accordance with the duration of the Management Board member's contract during the financial year in question.

Financial performance criteria

The bonus amount to be disbursed depends on the respective Management Board member's level of target achievement with regard to the targets set by the Supervisory Board for that member based on financial performance criteria within the meaning of section 87a(1) sentence 2 no. 4 of the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG).

Types of financial performance criteria

To determine the STI Target Amount, the Supervisory Board selects at least one of the following assessment bases: revenue, EBITDA (earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization), EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes), EBIT margin, ROCE (return on capital employed), TSR (total shareholder return), cash flow, free cash flow and working capital.

Each of these assessment bases is subject to separate specifications in terms of their composition and how they are calculated. All figures are derived from the Company's budget and its financial reporting, which is based on the consolidated financial statements and thus follows the accounting policies applied by the Company. Should the accounting policies change, comparability will be ensured. Non-recurring items, as may arise from acquisitions, are excluded from the calculation. The Supervisory Board may decide to deviate from this stipulation on a case-by-case basis.

Key financial performance indicators are revenue, EBITDA, EBIT, ROCE, TSR, free cash flow and working capital. The Hönle Group's use of EBITDA and EBIT means that Management Board remuneration depends on the profitability of

the Company and thus supports one of the Company's most important strategic objectives. As for the other performance criteria, ROCE refers to return on capital employed and indicates how efficiently capital is used to generate profits. ROCE is defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by capital employed. Total shareholder return (TSR) refers to the return on investments in Hönle stock and is calculated from the share price trend including reinvested dividends and adjusted for capital changes. Free cash flow (FCF) refers to total cash and cash equivalents available for the purpose of distributing dividends, making acquisitions and paying down debt. FCF is calculated as net cash from operating activities less capital expenditure, net interest income and payments of the principal portion of lease liabilities. Working capital is the difference between the Company's current assets and its current liabilities. It serves as a benchmark for liquidity and short-term funding needs.

The Supervisory Board sets the targets for each financial year prior to the start of the year on the basis of the Company budget, which is prepared by the Management Board and approved by the Supervisory Board. Financial performance criteria that are partially or fully identical may be set for Management Board members at the due discretion of the Supervisory Board.

Determining the level of target achievement: financial performance criteria

The level of target achievement (expressed as a percent) is calculated with respect to the aforementioned financial performance criteria by the Supervisory Board on the basis of the audited financial statements for the respective financial year. For each financial performance criterion, the level required for 100% target achievement corresponds to the value assigned in the budget adopted by the Supervisory Board for the respective financial year. The level achieved must fall within a corridor of 80% to 150% of the target level to be considered. Within that corridor, the level of target achievement is calculated on a straight-line basis by way of comparison with the actual figure for the financial year.

Non-financial performance criteria

In addition to financial performance criteria, the Supervisory Board establishes non-financial performance criteria for specific Management Board members or for the Management Board as a whole prior to the start of each financial year. The non-financial performance criteria consist of one or more of the following:

- Strategic corporate targets such as meeting key strategic objectives, tapping new markets, making strategic, technical or structural changes to the Company based on sustainability factors or putting any restructuring plans into effect;
- Strategically relevant projects implemented and other operating milestones, e.g. in the areas of sales and marketing, research and development, IT, finance or legal;
- Targets associated with good corporate governance, customer satisfaction, employee concerns and corporate culture, including initiatives to improve employer attractiveness and employee satisfaction and initiatives supporting leadership development, diversity and equal opportunity as well as sustainability (ESG goals).

Establishing non-financial performance criteria

The Supervisory Board sets the targets for each financial year prior to the start of the year on the basis of the Company budget approved by the Supervisory Board. Initially, the Supervisory Board may specify measurable targets for non-financial performance criteria, insofar as the criterion in question is measurable. Alternatively, the Supervisory Board may set targets whose achievement can at least be verified even if the targets cannot be measured precisely. In so doing, it is necessary (and also sufficient) that a third-party observer be able to follow the logic applied, i.e. that achievement of the target that cannot be measured precisely is at least linked to objective factors, and plausible arguments can be made to support the level of target achievement. Targets that are partially or fully identical may be set for the Management Board at the due discretion of the Supervisory Board.

The degree of target achievement of non-financial targets is also calculated after the end of the respective financial year and expressed as a percentage. For each non-financial performance criterion, the level required for 100% target achievement corresponds to the level set by the Supervisory Board for the respective performance criterion prior to the start of the financial year. The level achieved must fall within a corridor of 80% to 150% of the target level to be considered. Within that corridor, the level of target achievement is calculated on a straight-line basis by way of comparison with the actual figure for the financial year.

Payout of the STI

The STI is payable one month after approval of the annual and consolidated financial statements for the financial year to which the STI applies.

2.3.2.2 Long-term variable remuneration (LTI)

Purpose and calculation of the LTI

Our long-term incentive (LTI) program comprises a performance share plan with a three-year performance period and a one-year vesting period. Our long-term variable remuneration is equity-based and follows the share price of Hönle stock. Like the STI plan, it also depends on the level of target achievement of the financial and non-financial performance criteria. The LTI plan is geared toward driving sustainable development and incentivising long-term, sustainable increases in enterprise value by rewarding internal and external performance over a period of several years.

When establishing the financial and non-financial performance criteria relevant for setting the LTI target amount (the "LTI Target Amount"), the Supervisory Board selects from the criteria specified for the STI in section 2.3.2.1 of this Remuneration Report. Therefore, please refer to section 2.3.2.1 for information on the types of performance criteria that can be considered. The Supervisory Board is tasked with ensuring that different criteria apply to the LTI and the STI.

Weighting financial and non-financial targets in the LTI, target corridor

When establishing the LTI Target Amount, financial performance criteria are weighted at 60% and non-financial performance criteria at 40%. The Supervisory Board selects at least three intermediate targets and a target bonus amount for 100% target achievement. Those targets too must be specific, measurable, achievable, appropriate and time-bound. If specific non-financial performance criteria cannot be measured, or can only be measured with difficulty, it may be sufficient for target achievement to be verifiable. The information provided on the STI in section 2.3.2.1 applies accordingly. Target achievement, especially the achievement of financial targets is determined on the basis of the figures presented in the Company's consolidated financial statements.

The targets are set individually for the Management Board by the Supervisory Board prior to the start of the performance period. Targets that are partially or fully identical may be set for the Management Board at the due discretion of the Management Board. As with the STI, the LTI applies within a target corridor of 80% to 150%, i.e. the level achieved must fall within a corridor of 80% to 150% of the target level to be considered. Within that corridor, the level of target achievement is calculated on a straight-line basis (see section 2.3.2.1 for more information).

Performance shares

After setting the targets and the target bonus amount for the LTI, the target bonus amount is converted into performance shares using the weighted average price of Hönle shares for the 30 trading days prior to the beginning of the financial year in which the relevant three-year performance period began. The calculation is based on the share price in Xetra trading, i.e. Deutsche Börse AG's electronic trading platform. Performance shares are purely theoretical and are allocated on a prorated basis at the end of the three-year performance period depending on the level of target achievement. The shares are allocated one month after approval of the consolidated financial statements. Four years after the start of the performance period – i.e. taking into account the three-year performance period and a one-year vesting period – the performance shares allocated are converted into cash. The conversion rate is based on the weighted average price of Hönle shares for the 30 trading days prior to the end of the vesting period.

Payout of the LTI

The tranches issued each year have a total term of four years, consisting of a three-year performance period and a one-year vesting period. Each term commences on the first day of the respective financial year. When calculating the payout, the maximum remuneration amount should be taken into consideration. The LTI is paid out in cash one month after approval of the Company's consolidated financial statements, after expiry of the vesting period.

2.4 Special bonus payment

In exceptional cases, the Supervisory Board may decide at its due discretion to award a member of the Management Board a bonus for special achievements in the interests of the Company, provided the award of a bonus would benefit the Company's business strategy and its long-term performance. The special bonus is a one-off award that does not establish any rights in the future. Any such special bonus is capped at 10% of the Management Board member's base remuneration and may only be awarded as a cash payment. The decision to award such a special bonus for the financial year in which the Management Board member's achievement predominantly occurred is made at the time the level of STI target achievement is determined for that same financial year. Should the Supervisory Board grant a special bonus, the special bonus will be payable at the same time as the STI bonus.

2.5 Ongoing review and adjustment of performance criteria

Each year, the Supervisory Board reviews the appropriateness of the total remuneration granted, which includes the fixed remuneration and the variable remuneration components. The review focuses in particular on the intended incentive effects, especially if the financial and non-financial performance criteria still suitably and appropriately reflect current corporate objectives and have the incentivising effect intended by the Supervisory Board. If the Supervisory Board is of the opinion that this is not the case, it is entitled to make appropriate adjustments to the financial and non-financial performance criteria and to the ratios used to determine achievement of variable remuneration components for future financial years, provided the resulting remuneration does not fall below the total target remuneration amount.

2.6 Adjustments in the event of extraordinary developments

In the event of extraordinary developments, the Supervisory Board is entitled to adjust the amounts of individual remuneration components, including the total target remuneration, the relative share of the remuneration components in the total remuneration, the criteria for target achievement and the respective payout amounts as well as the payout dates, even after the start of the respective performance period. Extraordinary developments are said to apply if a situation has occurred, or is more likely than not to occur, that could not have been foreseen when the targets for the variable remuneration components were set and that have a significant impact on the total remuneration paid out to Management Board members. Extraordinary developments include significant acquisitions, disposal of significant portions of the company, substantial changes in the underlying accounting standards or tax regulations, natural disasters, pandemics or comparable events, unusually far-reaching changes in the economic environment (e.g. due to a severe economic or financial crisis) or disruptive market decisions by customers, insofar as these or their specific effects could not have been foreseen. Generally unfavourable market developments are not considered "extraordinary developments" in the aforementioned sense.

In the event of extraordinary developments where making adjustments to existing remuneration components would not suffice to restore the incentivising effect for Management Board members, the Supervisory Board is also entitled to temporarily grant additional remuneration components under the same conditions.

2.7 Malus/clawback

The Supervisory Board reserves the right to respond to extraordinary developments in a suitable manner. In the event of compliance violations, unethical behaviour or serious breaches of statutory or contractual obligations by a member of the Management Board, the Supervisory Board is entitled to withhold or reduce any STI or LTI amounts not yet paid out (malus) or to reclaim any variable remuneration components already paid out (clawback) at its due discretion.

The malus and clawback provisions do not affect any liability to the Company for damages on the part of the Management Board member.

If variable remuneration components are calculated or paid out on the basis of incorrect data, such as incorrect consolidated financial statements, the Supervisory Board may rectify the calculation and reclaim any remuneration components that have already been paid out.

2.8 Sideline activities, crediting remuneration from company mandates and sideline activities

If Management Board members receive remuneration from mandates that they hold in the interests of the Company, they must either transfer such remuneration to the Company or have it offset against the remuneration owed by the Company, unless the Supervisory Board decides against offsetting it at its due discretion.

If Management Board members receive remuneration or benefits from a company in which Dr. Hönle AG or a Hönle Group company holds an equity interest, such remuneration or benefits must be offset against the remuneration owed by Dr. Hönle AG.

Prior approval from the Supervisory Board is required to hold Supervisory Board mandates or positions of a comparable nature with companies outside the Group as well as to work with associations and or other bodies. The

Supervisory Board may, at its due discretion, make its approval subject to the condition that any remuneration received in return for exercising such a mandate be offset against the remuneration owed by the Company.

2.9 Contract duration, termination options, remuneration upon cessation of a Management Board position2.9.1 Contract duration and termination options

On first appointment, Management Board members are appointed for a term of no longer than three years. Reappointments are generally also for a term of three years. In exceptional cases, the Supervisory Board may approve a longer reappointment term of up to five years. The term of Management Board contracts is limited to the duration of the current appointment. Management Board contracts may include a renewal clause according to which the contract will renew automatically for the period of the Management Board member's reappointment. When a new member joins the Management Board, the Supervisory Board decides at its due discretion whether and to what extent the new Management Board member will be granted additional remuneration.

Management Board contracts cease at the end of the month in which the Management Board member reaches the age of 65. The Supervisory Board may deviate from that expiration date or from the standard retirement age stipulated in Management Board contracts at its due discretion.

Management Board contracts do not contain any provisions for ordinary termination. This does not impact the right of either party to terminate the contract for good cause.

2.9.2 Remuneration and severance payment in the event of premature cessation of a Management Board position

If a Management Board member is dismissed by the Supervisory Board before the end of their contract term without good cause, a severance payment may be granted. However, the amount of the severance payment will be limited to one year's total remuneration, and the payment may not exceed the remuneration due for the remaining term of the Management Board contract. Thus the total annual remuneration comprises the fixed remuneration, the STI entitlement – pro-rated until the date on which the Management Board member leaves the Management Board – as well as the LTI, insofar as performance shares have been allocated. If any performance shares granted are included in the severance payment, they will be awarded at the end of the respective vesting period in accordance with the normal cycle.

If a Management Board contract is terminated early for good cause by the Company, or if the Management Board contract is terminated at the request of the Management Board member, no severance payment will be granted. In such case, the Supervisory Board may decide at its due discretion whether to pay a pro-rated STI. The Supervisory Board may also decide at its due discretion whether to award performance shares already allocated after the end of vesting period. Any unallocated performance shares will be forfeited.

A change of control does not establish an extraordinary right to termination on the part of either the Management Board or the Company.

2.10 Post-contractual non-compete clause

A non-compete clause may be stipulated for the period after cessation of the Management Board contract. Appropriate compensation of up to 75% of the most recent contractual benefits received by the Management Board member may be granted annually during the non-compete period. When calculating the compensation, variable remuneration components are included on the basis of the averages for the last three full financial years in accordance with the remuneration system. The compensation is paid in monthly instalments. The Company may waive the post-contractual non-compete clause prior to or upon termination of the Management Board contract with effect from receipt of the corresponding declaration.

Payments made due to premature termination of a Management Board member's contract in accordance with section 2.9.2 of this Remuneration Report will be offset against any non-compete compensation payments.

2.11 Temporary deviations

The Supervisory Board may temporarily deviate from certain components of the remuneration system where necessary in the interest of the Company's long-term well-being. This applies in particular to situations in which deviation from the remuneration system is necessary to support the long-term interests and sustainability of the Company as a whole or to ensure its profitability. Such situations may be based on exceptional circumstances involving either the general economy or the Company. Deviations are permitted in particular in economic crises,

during which the remuneration deemed appropriate for Management Board members on the basis of the remuneration system and the resulting incentive structure may not appear to be sufficient to support the Company's interests.

The Supervisory Board may also temporarily suspend granting any variable remuneration at all if, after due assessment, the Supervisory Board comes to the conclusion that granting variable remuneration is not in the long-term interest of the Company in view of the extraordinary situation.

In addition, statutory provisions stipulate that the Supervisory Board may reduce the remuneration extended to Management Board members to an appropriate amount after the fact if a company's situation deteriorates to such an extent that it would be unfair for the company to continue to pay the remuneration.

2.12 Procedure for determining, implementing and reviewing the remuneration system

The Supervisory Board decides on a clear and understandable remuneration system for the members of the Management Board. At present, the Dr. Hönle AG Supervisory Board consists of five members. Since there is no personnel committee, the review of the remuneration system is prepared and carried out by the full Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board carries out the review of the remuneration system at its due discretion, at least, however, every four years. The Supervisory Board may involve external consultants to this end.

The Supervisory Board submits the compensation system to the Annual General Meeting for approval whenever there is a significant change, but at least every four years. If the Annual General Meeting does not approve the submitted remuneration system, the Supervisory Board shall submit a reviewed remuneration system to the Annual General Meeting for approval at the next ordinary Annual General Meeting at the latest. The Supervisory Board uses suitable measures to ensure that possible conflicts of interest concerning the Supervisory Board members involved in the consultations and decisions regarding the remuneration system are avoided or resolved. The Supervisory Board members are obliged to inform the Supervisory Board Chairman about any potential conflicts of interest. The Supervisory Board decides on how to deal with an existing conflict of interest on a case-by-case basis. This would apply in particular, if a Supervisory Board member affected by a conflict of interest fails to attend a meeting or take part in individual consultations and decisions to be taken by the Supervisory Board.

Information on a reviewed remuneration system

On 20 March 2024, the Annual General Meeting approved the remuneration system presented by the Supervisory Board for the first time. The remuneration system has remained unchanged since then.

The Annual General Meeting approved the remuneration report for financial year 2022/2023 on 20 March 2024.

Remuneration granted and owed to the members of the Management Board in the 2023/2024 financial year

Fixed and variable remuneration components and their relative share

		1			D · · D	5 D : L :
				Markus Arendt		Franz Richter
				since 01.05.2024	till 31.12.2023	till 30.04.2024
		2023/2024	in T€	215	58	210
	fixed fee		in %	98	91	98
		2022/2023	in T€	0	246	156
			in %	0	94	60
		2023/2024	in T€	4	6	4
	fringe benefit		in %	2	9	2
performance-		2022/2023	in T€	0	15	0
independent		2022, 2023	in %	0	6	0
renumeration		2023/2024	in T€	0	0	0
renumeration	retirement benefits	2023/2024	in %	0	0	0
	Tethement benefits	2022/2023	in T€	0	0	0
		2022/2023	in %	0	0	0
		2023/2024	in T€	219	63	214
	total	2023/2024	in %	100	100	100
	total	2022/2022	in T€	0	261	156
		2022/2023	in %	0	100	100
		2022/2024	in T€	0	0	0
		2023/2024	in %	0	0	0
	short-term incentive (STI)	2022/2023	in T€	0	0	0
			in %	0	0	0
<i>.</i>			in T€	0	0	0
performance-		2023/2024	in %	0	0	0
dependent	long-term incentive (LTI)	/	in T€	0	0	0
renumeration		2022/2023	in %	0	0	0
			in T€	0	0	0
		2023/2024	in %	0	0	0
	total		in T€	0	0	0
		2022/2023	in %	0	0	0
			in T€	219	63	214
total including add	litions to retirement benefits	2023/2024	in %	100	100	100
	according to IAS 19		in T€	0	261	156
		2022/2023	in %	0	100	100
	total without additions to retirement benefits		in T€	219	63	214
total without add			in %	100	100	100
according to IAS 19			in T€	0	261	100
		2022/2023	in %	0	100	
		111 7/0	0	100	100	

Further disclosures pursuant to Section 162, German Stock Corporation Act

No shares or stock options were granted or promised to the members of the Dr. Hönle AG Management Board and Supervisory Board. In the 2023/2024 financial year, no use was made of the option to reclaim variable remuneration components.

The specified maximum remuneration for the members of the Management Board was complied with in all aspects.

Compliance with the maximum remuneration concerning the Management Board remuneration in the 2023/2024 financial year

		Markus Arendt			Ra	ainer Pump	e	Franz Richter				
		since 01.05.2024			ti	till 31.12.2023			01.05.2023 - 30.04.2024			
in T€		target	expense	maximum	target	expense	maximum	target	expense	maximum		
	fixed remuneration	215	215	215	58	58	58	210	210	210		
	ancillary service	4	4	4	6	6	6	4	4	4		
performance- independent	retirement benefits	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
remuneration	benefits from termination of employment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	total	219	219	219	63	63	63	214	214	214		
performance- dependent	short-term renumeration long-term	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
compensation	component I	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	total	0	0	0	0	0	800	0	0	800		
sum		219	219	1.200	63	63	1.400	214	214	1.400		

Remuneration granted and owed to former members of the Management Board in the 2023/2024 financial year

In the 2022/2023 financial year, Mr. Haimerl terminated his employment on the Management Board before his service contract expired (original term until March 31, 2025.

			Norbert Haimerl
			ab 01.05.2023
	2023/2024	in T€	0
benefits from termination of employment	2023/2024	in %	0
benefits nom termination of employment	2022/2023	in T€	771
	2022/2023	in %	94
	2023/2024	in T€	0
allocation to retirement benefits according to IAS 19	2023/2024	in %	0
	2022/2023	in T€	47
	2022/2023	in %	6
	2023/2024	in T€	17
retirement benefits	2023/2024	in %	100
	2022/2023	in T€	0
		in %	0
	2023/2024	in T€	0
performance-independent renumeration		in %	0
	2022/2023	in T€	206
	2022/2023	in %	25
	2023/2024	in T€	0
fringe benefits	2023/2024	in %	0
inige benefits	2022/2023	in T€	3
	2022/2023	in %	0
	2023/2024	in T€	17
total	2023, 2024	in %	100
	2022/2023	in T€	818
	2022/2023	in %	100

The remuneration of Supervisory Board members is specified in the Articles of Association or approved by the Annual General Meeting in accordance with Section 113 (1) sentence 2 AktG. Pursuant to Section 113 (1) sentence 3 AktG, the remuneration should be proportionate to the tasks of the Supervisory Board members and the situation of the Company.

The underlying remuneration system for the members of the Supervisory Board of Dr. Hönle AG is presented below.

Remuneration review procedure

The Supervisory Board reviews the appropriateness of the structure and level of its remuneration. For this purpose, the Supervisory Board evaluates the remuneration of the Supervisory Board at other comparable companies and compares it with the remuneration of the Supervisory Board of the Company. On the basis of this analysis, the Supervisory Board examines the appropriateness of its remuneration.

The German Stock Corporation Act [Aktiengesetz] provides for regular approval of the remuneration system by the Annual General Meeting at least every four years. Consequently, the Supervisory Board analyses the Company's remuneration system at least every four years in preparation for the respective resolutions. If there is reason to change the remuneration system, the Management Board and Supervisory Board shall submit a corresponding proposal for a resolution to the Annual General Meeting.

Actual structure of the remuneration system

The remuneration contains exclusively fixed payments which are based on the duties and responsibilities of the respective Supervisory Board member. No other remuneration, for example from advisory or brokerage services, is granted. The remuneration of the Supervisory Board is set out in Section 14 of the Company's Articles of Association. The remuneration scheme is as follows:

Annual remuneration of €30,000 each is granted to the members of the Company's Supervisory Board. The Supervisory Board Chairman receives twice the amount of an ordinary member of the Supervisory Board, i.e. €60,000, and his deputy receives one and a half the amount of an ordinary Supervisory Board member, i.e. €45,000. The remuneration is due for payment to the members of the Supervisory Board four weeks after the end of the respective financial year. The above-stated remuneration to the Supervisory Board members was paid for the first time at the beginning of the October 01, 2018 financial year.

Members of the Supervisory Board who were not in office for the entire financial year receive one twelfth of the remuneration for each commenced month of their activity.

The members of the Supervisory Board are also reimbursed for expenses incurred within the scope of their duties. The value-added tax (VAT) invoiced by a Supervisory Board member or disclosed in a credit note replacing the invoice will be paid additionally, based on the applicable statutory rate..

Granted and owed remuneration of the Supervisory Board

in T€	2023/2024	2022/2023
Niklas Friedrichsen (since 24 March 2022)	48	43
Bernhard Gimple	38	30
Günther Henrich (until 20 March 2024)	22	45
Karl Hönle (until 23 March.2023)	0	30
Imke Libon	30	30
Melanie Ott (since 20 March 2024)	15	0
Franz Richter (since 23 March.2023)	25	5
	178	183

Comparative presentation of the annual change in the remuneration of Management Board and Supervisory Board members, the development of the Company's earnings and the average remuneration of employees over the last five financial years.

	Change		Change 2023/2024		Change	2022/2023	Change	2021/2022	Change	2020/2021	Change	2019/2020
	2023/2024	2022/2023	compared to	2022/2023	compared to	2021/2022	compared to	2020/2021	compared to	2019/2020	compared to	2018/2019
	in T€	in T€	in T€	in %	in T€	in %	in T€	in %	in T€	in %	in T€	in %
Board Member												
Markus Arendt since 01.05.2024	219	0	219	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rainer Pumpe since 01.01.2021	63	260	-197	-76	1	0	3	1	257	-	-	-
Franz Richter 01.05.2023- 30.04.2024	214	156	58	37	156	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Aufsichtsrats- mitglieder												
Niklas Friedrichsen since 26.04.2022	48	43	5	10	25	139	18	-	-	-	-	-
Bernhard Gimple since 20.03.2015	38	30	8	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Günther Henrich since 20.03.2015	23	45	-23	-50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Karl Hönle till 23.03.2023	0	30	-30	-100	-30	-50	-	-	-	-	-	-
Imke Libon since 20.05.2021	30	30	0	-	-	-	12	67	18	-	-	-
Melanie Ott since 01.05.2023	15	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Franz Richter since 01.05.2023	25	5	20	400	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Employee average Compensation Dr. Hönle AG	64	64	11	17	11	20	2	4	6	13	-1	-3
Earnings Performance												
Consolidated Net Profit/Loss	-13.000	-13.198	198	-19	2.270	17	-8.338	-172	-10.465	-187	-6.791	-55
Net Profit/Loss Dr. Hönle AG	-5.538	-21.364	15.826	20	14.434	68	-3.203	-18	-18.776	-3053	-1.526	-71

The average remuneration of the employees of Dr. Hönle AG is based on full-time equivalents, i.e. a pro-rata calculation of part-time employees excluding members of the Management Board, trainees and agency workers.

Dr. Markus Arendt Management Board Dr. Franz Richter Supervisory Board Chairman

Report of the Independent Auditor on the Audit of the Remuneration Report pursuant to Sec. 162 (3) AktG

To Dr. Hönle Aktiengesellschaft, Gilching

Audit Opinion

We have conducted a formal audit of the remuneration report of Dr. Hönle Aktiengesellschaft, Gilching, for the financial year from 1 October 2023 to 30 September 2024 to determine whether the disclosures required by Sec. 162 (1) and (2) AktG ["Aktiengesetz": German Stock Corporation Act] have been made therein. In accordance with Sec. 162 (3) AktG we have not audited the content of the remuneration report.

In our opinion, the disclosures required by Sec. 162 (1) and (2) have been made in the accompanying remuneration report in all material respects. Our opinion does not cover the content of the remuneration report.

Basis for the Opinion

We conducted our audit in accordance with Sec. 162 (3) AktG and the IDW Assurance Standard: Audits of Remuneration Reports pursuant to Sec. 162 (3) AktG (IDW PS 870 (09.2023). Our responsibilities under this provision and standard are further described in the "Responsibilities of the auditor" section of our report. As an audit firm, we applied the IDW Standard on Quality Management: Requirements for Quality Management in the Audit Firm (IDW QMS 1 (09.2022)). We complied with the professional obligations pursuant to the WPO ["Wirtschaftsprüferordnung": German Law Regulating the Profession of Wirtschaftsprüfer (German Public Auditor)] and the BS WP/vBP ["Berufssatzung für Wirtschaftsprüfer/vereidigte Buchprüfer": Professional Charter for German Public Accountants/German Sworn Auditors] including the requirements regarding independence.

Responsibilities of the Management Board and Supervisory Board

The Management Board and Supervisory Board are responsible for the preparation of the remuneration report and the related disclosures in compliance with the requirements of Sec. 162 AktG. In addition, they are responsible for such internal control as they have determined necessary to enable the preparation of the remuneration report that is free from material misstatement due to fraud (i.e. fraudulent financial reporting and misappropriation of assets) or error.

Responsibilities of the Auditor

Our objectives are to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the disclosures required by Sec. 162 (1) and (2) AktG are made in the remuneration report in all material respects and to express an opinion thereon in a report. We planned and performed our audit so as to determine the formal completeness of the remuneration report by comparing the disclosures made in the remuneration report with the disclosures required by Sec. 162 (1) and (2) AktG. In accordance with Sec. 162 (3) AktG, we have not audited the accuracy of the disclosures, the completeness of the individual disclosures or the fair presentation of the remuneration report.

Consideration of misrepresentations

In connection with our audit, our responsibility is to read the remuneration report considering the knowledge obtained in the audit of the financial statements and, in doing so, remain alert for indications of whether the remuneration report contains misrepresentations in relation to the accuracy of the disclosures, the completeness of the individual disclosures or the fair presentation of the remuneration report.

If, based on the work we have performed, we conclude that there is a misrepresentation, we are required to report that fact. We have nothing to report in this regard.

Munich, 24 January 2025

RSM Ebner Stolz GmbH & Co. KG Wirtschaftsprüfungsgesellschaft Steuerberatungsgesellschaft

Josef EberlFuat KalkanWirtschaftsprüferWirtschaftsprüfer[German Public Auditor][German Public Auditor]